The UAE’s space bid is about much more than just oil

The UAE's space bid is about much more than just oil

On 9 February 2021, Dubai’s Burj Khalifa tower was lit up with the message ‘Historic Achievement’, in tribute to the Al Amal (Hope) spacecraft, which on that day had successfully entered the orbit of Mars, completing the Arab world’s first interplanetary mission.

(Giuseppe Cacace/AFP)

For some time now, players such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE), with no tradition in the space industry but no less determined to occupy key positions, have been making their presence felt on the fringes of the space race between the major powers. A fine example is the historic milestone achieved by the UAE on placing the Al Amal (Hope) spacecraft in orbit around Mars, on 9 February 2021, to coincide with the country’s Golden Jubilee. It was a resounding success that will no doubt act as a real boost to the autocratic regime headed by de facto ruler Mohammed bin Zayed, better known as MBZ.

True, this huge technical feat makes the UAE the first Arab country to reach the red planet, the second country (after India) to do so on the first attempt, and the fifth in the world, ahead of China and preceded only by the USSR, the United States, the European Union and India. It is also true that Emirati engineers have dramatically improved the UAE’s capabilities since the creation of its space agency in 2014, initially thanks to cooperation agreements with Paris and London for the building of a few small satellites (such as the KhalifaSat, launched in October 2019) and with the sending of its first astronaut to the International Space Station in 2019.

It is no less true, however, that it still has a long way to go before it achieves sufficient autonomy to be able to speak on equal terms with the aforementioned powers, not least given that the Emirati probe was built and assembled in the United States – mainly in collaboration with the University of Colorado Boulder and other US universities – and was launched, on 19 July 2020, from the Tanegashima Space Centre in Japan, aboard a Japanese rocket. The UAE, with the Mohammed bin Rashid Space Centre (in operation since 2006) as the focal point, has nevertheless become a serious player in the space adventure of the future, having already announced its ambition to send a spacecraft to the moon in 2024 and to establish a human colony on Mars within the next 100 years.

International prestige, alternatives to crude and counter-revolution

In contrast to what the major powers – immersed in a geostrategic battle for global leadership in all areas – are primarily seeking, the Emirati endeavours in this field are driven by at least two aspirations: to raise its international prestige and to explore alternatives to the oil economy. On the first point, aware of the limitations imposed by its size – just 9.9 million inhabitants (of whom a mere 12 per cent are nationals) living in 83,000 km2 – the UAE has long sought to acquire a voice of its own, without allowing itself to be smothered by Saudi Arabia, the unquestionable but equally unpalatable leader of the Gulf Cooperation Council. And instead of doing so by championing democracy or human rights – areas in which it has failed miserably – it has opted, rather, to make a name for itself through attention-grabbing initiatives such as the Burj Khalifa tower – the tallest human-made construction on Earth, the hosting of Expo 2020 (postponed until October of this year) or the trip to Mars.

MBZ is, along with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, one of the main sponsors of a counter-revolution aimed at blocking any of the reforms that various Arab societies have been advocating since the start of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ ten years ago.

In his eagerness to eliminate dissidents and critics of any kind – with political Islam as his prime target – he has had no qualms about co-leading (with Riyadh) a military misadventure as tragic as the one underway in Yemen, taking sides with the rebels led by Khalifa Haftar in Libya, supporting the genocidal Syrian regime, or normalising relations with Israel. He believes that, by so doing, he is not only helping to neutralise any internal threats to a status quo with a clear democratic deficit, but that by taking on this prominent role, he is increasing his sway as a valid interlocutor in regional and even global affairs.

Regarding the second aspiration of finding alternatives to the oil economy, the passage of time is confirming that we are already immersed in an ecological transition seeking to overcome our dependence on fossil fuels for energy. For hydrocarbon-producing countries, this process, within the framework defined by the Paris Agreement, implies an urgent need to implement alternative strategic plans to modify the foundations of rentier and monoculture economies that have failed, in many cases, to sufficiently diversify their productive structures. Such economies are overly sensitive to the fluctuations in the prices of these raw materials on international markets. As a result, when confronted with a crisis like the one that erupted in 2008 – plus the fall in oil prices and the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic – they have a much harder time maintaining social peace, which is usually attained through subsidies and benefits that seek to ‘buy’ the loyalty of subjects who do not enjoy rights and freedoms.

The inefficiencies, the corruption and the repressive instincts of regimes driven by the overriding desire to stay in power, whatever it takes, become all the more visible under such circumstances.

The UAE is the Arab world’s second largest economy after Saudi Arabia, with an estimated GDP of just over US$420 billion (around €344 billion). According to the International Monetary Fund, its government deficit reached 9.9 per cent and its GDP fell by 6.6 per cent last year, whilst its growth forecast for this year is just 1.3 per cent. With full employment virtually guaranteed, it has sought to diversify its economy to the point where hydrocarbons only account for a third of the national economy. Conscious that the immediate future may be even more challenging, it is continuing along the same path, not only by equipping itself with new energy sources – such as the Barakah nuclear power plant, which has been in operation since August 2020, or the Al Dhafra solar photovoltaic power plant, the largest in the world – but also by consolidating its position as an international finance and tourism centre.

Other regional players join the race

The UAE’s decision to develop its space industry falls within the same strategy, although the sector was not among those identified as a priority when it launched Vision 2020, a decade ago. The plan did, however, clearly set out its commitment to a knowledge-based economy and society, and to making the UAE the point of contact between Europe, Africa and Asia in the economic sphere. With its bid to conquer space, the UAE is, in short, seeking to boost its national pride (although it has formally sought to present the Mars mission as a joint Arab project), as well as to bolster its human capital (more than 200 engineers – 34 per cent of them women – have been involved in the Al Amal project), to nurture its dream of regional hegemony (in open competition with Riyadh), to improve its chances of competing in a highly-demanding niche market (encouraging its nationals to go into science and aiming for space tourism) and even to whitewash its image as an authoritarian regime.

Other countries in the region are following close on its heels, with very similar intentions. Egypt, host of the headquarters of the African Union’s space agency, has had its own space agency since 2018, launched a telecommunications satellite (Tiba-1 in November 2019) and plans to send its first astronaut into space in 2026.

Turkey, for its part, has already announced its intention to carry out a moon landing in 2023, coinciding with the centenary of the founding of the Turkish Republic, and has launched a project to build a spaceport in Somalia as part of its space mission. Saudi Arabia has also expressed its intention, as part of its ambitious 2030 Vision, to develop this sector under the leadership of the Saudi Space Commission, created in 2018 and headed by Prince Sultan bin Salman Al-Saud, who became the first Arab astronaut in 1985. But ahead of all the players in this field is Iran, which has had its own space agency since 2004 and has a proven capacity to launch its own satellites, including military satellites, such as Noor, launched last year.

This article has been translated from Spanish.