The drums of war: the view from Europe

The drums of war: the view from Europe

“Unfortunately, there are many factors behind the widespread concern and deep pessimism that prevail when looking to the near future,” says Jesús A. Núñez Villaverde. Photo taken during the commemoration of Dutch Liberation Day (which commemorates the end of the Nazi occupation of the Netherlands during the Second War World), on 5 May 2024, in Rotterdam, the Netherlands.

(Mouneb Taimm/Middle East Images via AFP)

Driven by the hawkish hysteria of which Edgar Morin speaks in his 2023 book, De guerre en guerre: De 1940 à l’Ukraine (From War to War: From 1940 to Ukraine), it seems we are hopelessly headed towards a scenario where global conflict is the norm, as if we had learned nothing from the countless mistakes made, after so many violent conflicts, both within and between states.

Seen from within the European Union, a part of the world with the highest level of well-being and security, inhabited by post-heroic populations who tend to mistakenly believe that war is a thing of the past and that all disputes can be resolved by non-violent means, this prognosis alters the foundations of its post-imperial model. This model is fundamentally based on the idea that there are universal values and universal ethical frameworks, that interdependence makes the outbreak of violence highly improbable, and that narrowing the inequality gaps between people inhabiting the same territory are the central pillars that invariably lead to a fairer, safer and more sustainable world.

Unfortunately, there are many factors behind the widespread concern and deep pessimism that prevail when looking to the near future, and call into question these basic assumptions of the EU-27.

One is the collapse of the international order that emerged out of the Second World War. That is, a supposedly rules-based order deprived of a United Nations capable of managing it (due to the unwillingness of its leading members), which primarily serves Washington’s interests and which cannot hide the double standards with which the actions of some of its members are judged (the example of Russia and Israel being just one of many). The absence of a global authority with the real ability to ensure that everyone complies with the rules of the game and to sanction those who break them is compounded by the fact that the actual world leader, the United States, is no longer capable of fulfilling, albeit inappropriately, the role of global policeman. And this is giving greater incentive to those who aspire to take its place – China and Russia, for example – and to those who now feel more critical of the status quo and feel freer to depart from the script – the countries of the Global South.

It is hardly surprising, under such conditions, that we are already in the midst of an all-out strategic contest between Washington and Beijing, dragging along many other actors from all over the world, with the US trying to maintain its hegemony at all costs and China seeking to take its place as soon as possible.

Meanwhile, the lack of an effective global policeman and the decline of the US’s power is encouraging other actors to explore their prospects of becoming regional leaders or to take unresolved issues with their neighbours into their own hands. As a result, as is immediately apparent when assessing the growing level of violence being witnessed today, force is increasingly being used everywhere, taking advantage of the relative power vacuum.

Added to this are objective realities such as the inattention to the many so-called ‘forgotten’ conflicts and the increase in the number of people suffering from hunger and chronic malnutrition, which inevitably calls into question the political will expressed in the UN motto “leave no one behind”. Nor does it seem, at the current pace, that the goals set out in the 2030 Agenda are going to be achieved, which will mean more people who will not be able to meet their most basic needs, more fundamental rights that will continue to be violated, and more delays in dealing with the climate emergency in which we are mired.

As an aggregate result of these factors, instability and insecurity have become basic features of the world we live in. And as an almost instinctive response we find ourselves again, as in the Cold War, with an agenda dominated primarily by a militaristic, if not warmongering, slant, driven by those who, despite the evidence to the contrary, continue to assume that more weapons mean more security.

Fear, hatred and disinformation fuelled by self-interest. And Vladimir Putin

It has to be understood that there are actors interested in promoting and fuelling fear and militarism as a response. Alongside the usual suspects, such as the arms trade, are all those playing ‘the worse, the better’ game, be they non-state actors or national governments. Among them are those who fuel hatred and disinformation from ultra-nationalist and populist positions, seeking to break the social peace and stir fratricidal confrontation because they believe that this divides and weakens any potential rivals, helping them achieve their goals of power and domination over others.

But it is also true that not everything can be reduced to the fears fuelled by false narratives, as there are also fears that are undeniably real. Seen from within the European Union, a name can be put to one of them: Russia.

The aggressiveness being displayed by Vladimir Putin, not only over Ukraine, is giving the EU a sense that it is under direct threat. Russia wants to be recognised as a global power and to retain its own sphere of influence in both Central Asia and Eastern Europe, and there is every indication that it is prepared to do so by force, if necessary. This attitude is undermining the continental security order, which has also been seriously destabilised by the imprudent decisions taken by the United States in recent years, to the point that we cannot rule out the possibility that the conflict in Ukraine could end up turning into a continent-wide conflict. Added to this is the possibility that Donald Trump will return to the White House and act on his threats, such as encouraging Russia to do whatever it wants with European NATO allies that do not meet the target of spending 2 per cent of their GDP on defence.

The confluence of these variables creates understandable concern among the EU-27. This concern is accentuated by the fact that the EU does not yet have a voice of its own on the international stage, much less the means to defend its own interests, given its dependence on Washington. For now, practically all of the EU-27 are substantially increasing their defence budgets, but without clearing up any doubts as to their ultimate objective: strategic autonomy or maintaining subordination to the US/NATO. What is, however, clear is that priority is still not being given to the search for an agreement among all Europeans (including Russia) to rebalance the continental security order, taking into account the legitimate interests of all states.

Equally, there is no sign that a shift towards the human security paradigm – focussed on the satisfaction of basic needs and full respect for the fundamental rights of all – as a vital component of the security of all states, will be seen any time soon. For now, state security – the defence of borders against external threats – seemingly takes precedence over human security, as though having the latest battle tank were more important than ensuring social peace within each individual state.

This article has been translated from Spanish.